1. Introduction {#sec1}
===============

Airports and air navigation services, as part of aviation infrastructure, play an important role in the productivity of airline services, and in the accessibility of airline services for passengers. In common with other infrastructure industries, aviation infrastructure has relatively high costs in comparison to demand. As airports are capital intensive and subject to indivisibilities, there is generally a single airport, or only a few airports, in a given geographic region. Competitive influences on key aeronautical services[1](#fn1){ref-type="fn"} can be weak depending on the particular circumstances of an airport, including its geographical location. Although potentially less capital intensive than airports, the safety requirements associated with air navigation services imply that a single air navigation service provider (ANSP) serves a geographic region. There is limited, if any, scope for direct competition between infrastructure providers within a geographic area, other than through competitive tendering for the provision of services within the area. In areas where there is considered not to be enough competition to protect users, economic regulation, in some form, is often applied to major airports and to ANSPs with the aim of achieving more economically efficient outcomes.

The demand for aviation services is subject to shocks due to external events, such as terrorist attacks, severe weather conditions, and geological events, the Eyjafjallajökull volcanic dust cloud in Iceland in May 2010 is a recent example. Changes in macroeconomic conditions, including exchange rates movements and financial crises, additionally have a magnified effect on the demand for aviation services. The occurrence of regulation of aviation infrastructure raises the question of the effect of regulation on the level of uncertainty faced by the aviation industry, and how industry uncertainties are taken into account in regulation. This paper examines economic regulation in the context of the uncertainties faced by aviation infrastructure services.

Price caps are a common approach to economic regulation applied to major airports, and an approach that is applied to some air navigation services. Under a price cap approach the overall level of prices is constrained over a period of time to an upper limit often linked to inflation minus a productivity factor, such as CPI -- X.[2](#fn2){ref-type="fn"} Under a price cap there are incentives for cost efficiency because the regulated firm is able to keep the gains from cost reduction which may be passed on to users at the next price review. Two types of price caps can be distinguished; 'pure' price caps and 'hybrid' price caps ([@bib20], [@bib24]). Under 'pure' price caps the overall level of price caps is primarily determined through the estimated productivity gains available to the regulated firm rather than through reference to the regulated firm\'s costs. 'Hybrid' price caps set the overall level of the price caps primarily based on the firm\'s costs, typically estimated forward looking, and efficient costs.

'Hybrid' price caps are the most typical form of price cap applied. The key feature of price-cap regulation in practice, is that a fair rate of return on the capital base is set *ex ante*, on the basis of the regulator\'s perception of efficiency savings and input prices over the control period ([@bib21]). The key advantage of the price cap form of regulation is that it provides incentives for cost reduction and efficient pricing. This approach compares with rate-of-return regulation where prices are regulated based on total costs including depreciation and a normal rate of return on capital and there is less incentives for cost reduction and efficient pricing for the regulated firm. It is commonly applied to airports in North America and some European countries. There are additional variants of these two broad types of regulation, including 'sliding scale regulation' which relates the level of charges negatively to passenger growth over a given period of time. The price cap form of regulation, and how this form of economic regulation manages uncertainty for aviation infrastructure, is this focus of this paper.

Australia has experienced a wide range of regulatory approaches to aviation infrastructure in a short period of time. CPI-X price caps were applied to 11 newly privatized airports in 1997 and 1998 and were removed in 2001 and 2002. In 2002 light-handed regulation in the form of price monitoring was applied to aeronautical services at the five largest airports in 2002, replacing price caps. In addition, since 1995 regulation of airport services under the National Access Regime can potentially apply to airports, and has applied on some occasions. Regulation of air navigation services changed from a short term annual cost-based approach to the establishment of a 'long term price path' in 2004. This broad range of regulatory experience applied to aviation infrastructure provides interesting case study material for analysts of regulatory approaches.

Two case studies in regulation of aviation infrastructure in Australia illustrate very different approaches to the management of uncertainty faced by aviation infrastructure services. Australian experience is particularly interesting. A dramatic fall in demand for aviation services occurred in Australia at time when price caps were applied to newly privatized airports, and preceding the introduction of a long term price path for air navigation services. In October 2001, Ansett Australia, a major Australian domestic airline carrier, ceased operation coinciding with a global reduction in demand associated with the September 11 terrorist attacks in the USA. The severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) epidemic followed in 2002. The island nature of Australia, its large size, and the distances between major cities mean that there is a heavy reliance on air services. These characteristics contrast with those in some other countries where there is greater substitutability between airports and between modes of transport, such as in many European countries, where as a result the case for economic regulation of airports is considerably weaker.

The paper describes the approach taken to regulatory price determination and the management of industry uncertainties in each of the two case studies. Information for each case study is sourced from Government publications, regulatory documents, a review of airport regulation undertaken by the Productivity [@bib14], two regulatory reviews of Airservices' prices undertaken by the [@bib4], [@bib3] and discussions with industry representations.[3](#fn3){ref-type="fn"} The structure of the regulatory frameworks is assessed in relation to regulatory risk and principles of good regulation.

The structure of the paper is as follows. An initial background discussion of regulatory risk and principles of good regulation is contained in section [2](#sec2){ref-type="sec"}. A case study on the application and removal of price caps on airports in Australia follows in section [3](#sec3){ref-type="sec"}. The second case study, the development of a long term price path for Airservices, is then presented in section [4](#sec4){ref-type="sec"}. Section [5](#sec5){ref-type="sec"} examines the Australian case studies described in sections [3](#sec3){ref-type="sec"}, [4](#sec4){ref-type="sec"} to assess how well regulation handled uncertainty. Finally, conclusions are made in section [6](#sec6){ref-type="sec"}.

2. Economic regulation of infrastructure and risk {#sec2}
=================================================

2.1. Regulatory risk {#sec2.1}
--------------------

In general risk is defined under international standards as "an effect of uncertainty on objectives" which can be positive or negative ([@bib27]). Identifying a source of risk involves envisaging an event that may or may not occur, the likelihood of the event occurring and the possible consequences of the event. Regulation impacts on the degree of 'market risk' to which a company is exposed. Market risk, unlike firm-specific, idiosyncratic risk, cannot be eliminated by means of portfolio diversification and is therefore of great importance to risk-averse investors ([@bib29]).

Regulation potentially causes different types of risks for a firm. The form of regulation, such as whether a price cap approach is applied or rate of return regulation is used, is one potential source of risk. A company with high fixed costs that is under price-cap regulation faces excessive risk from demand fluctuations as these movements significantly affect the company\'s income but leave its cost level relatively unchanged ([@bib8]). The link between regulatory structure and risk in infrastructure industries has been the subject of studies including comparisons of UK price cap regulation and US rate-of-return regulation. The studies undertaken usually focus on the effect of the regulatory structure on the regulated firm\'s cost of capital.

[@bib8] considered the evidence from a large number of countries to disentangle the influence of regulation on risk as measured by a firm\'s cost of capital. Their investigation involved studying regulated utilities in the UK, the Pacific region, Europe and North and South America. They show that the choice of regulatory regime affects the level of shareholder risk for the regulated company. They found that investors bear the greatest non-diversifiable risk with price caps and the least non-diversifiable risk with rate-of-return regulation. They considered that their results were in line with earlier more limited studies. The problem of focusing on just one specific element of what is a complete financial package is identified. The determination of the rate base and the way in which investment is treated are among other factors that are important."In general, there is a trade-off between incentives to improve efficiency and the degree of risk to which a company is exposed. A company will not strive to lower its costs unless it benefits from these reductions, but an inability to pass on cost changes to customers means that the company faces risk from uncontrollable cost fluctuations. ([@bib8], p.7)"

Extending the earlier analysis, [@bib9] consider the various methodological questions that arise in the transport sector when establishing the link between the degree of market risk and a regulatory regime. Transport specific issues to consider include the presence of intermodal competition, the existence of shorter contracts and the geographic coverage of the companies. The results of quantitative studies confirm that even for the transport sector the choice of regulatory regime greatly affects the degree of market risk a company will face. However, the specific characteristics of regulatory frameworks and the regulatory decisions themselves may change a firm\'s future cost of capital. They consider that there are a range of areas to assess in evaluating the effect of a regulatory regime including:•If an incentive based regime applies, how long is the period between the price reviews?•How is investment treated?•How much discretion is the regulator allowed at each review?•What are the characteristics of the regulatory office?

A survey article by [@bib28] on infrastructure regulation and investment for the long-term finds that generic ownership forms (e.g. state ownership, private ownership) do not seem to be related to a specific investment pattern, such as under or over investment. It is the exact specification of the regulatory system that matters. Regulation needs to be refined to combine the advantages of incentive-based regulation with the appropriate investment incentives, and to develop other instruments, such as sliding-scale regulation and other sharing-mechanisms.

[@bib19] carried out an empirical investigation on whether different types of regulatory regimes, such as price cap regimes and rate-of-return forms of regulation, have different impacts on the level of risk incurred by regulated firms. He uses 93 regulated companies operating in six English-speaking countries with similar traditions, Australia, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, UK and USA, during the period 1995--2004. Gaggero takes into account the underlying elements of the regulatory regime in which each company operates, such as whether price caps are of the 'pure' kind or whether they exhibit intermediate characteristics such as earnings sharing plans. He estimates the impact of the method of regulation (as measured by an index) on equity betas, the firms\' systematic (non-diversifiable) risk. Using a more homogeneous sample of countries and a later time period, the results obtained by Gaggero are different from [@bib8] and do not support the hypothesis that price cap regulation imposes more risk based on estimates of betas.

The implementation of price cap regulation often allows for the pass through of certain cost items deemed to be beyond the control of the company. This will reduce the exposure of the utility to risk providing such cost pass through provisions are implemented in a systematic manner ([@bib21]). Alternative forms of regulation may therefore not be the sole cause of the difference in the asset betas. Additional factors that could cause changes in betas, as well as the regulatory regime, include the political environment, the operating environments, variations in the level of competition, and non-utility activities.

The degree of predictability of regulatory behavior, that is a regulator\'s discretionary power, in the form of unpredicted regulatory interventions, is a factor that can increase the volatility of a company\'s returns and a regulated company\'s cost of capital. [@bib23] argue that a complete set of rules is very difficult (if not impossible) to specify in advance, and the costs of adapting pre-specified rules to changing circumstances through legislative amendment are considered to be greater than those of relying on regulatory decisions made within the terms of more open-ended standards. [@bib26] similarly points out that regulatory discretion may be required for a proper application of regulatory instruments, for example, changing market conditions over time necessities the ability to deal with them.

Focusing on the UK, [@bib26] examines the role of the regulatory asset base as an instrument of regulatory commitment for infrastructure industries. He concludes that the regulatory asset base (RAB) can provide a useful safety net for keeping down the cost of capital for privately financed infrastructure investment. Further, he argues that the role of RAB as a commitment device is a consequence of the quality of its implementation rather than from the definition of the RAB per se. The quality of the regulatory setting is important, including formal, legal frameworks and informal experience, such as the transparency and consistency of regulatory decisions affecting the RAB and related financing issues.

In summary, there are a broad range of considerations to be taken into account in determining the impact of regulation on uncertainty faced by firms. The details of the regulatory framework, such as the nature of regulatory discretion and the treatment of investment, are important considerations in addition to the form of regulation, such as whether a price cap or rate-of-return approach is adopted. While regulatory changes will impact on risk, the effect will depend on a number of factors, such as the framework under which they are made and how they are made. Understanding regulatory risk is important for policy design as the design of a regulatory system has a significant impact on the degree of systematic risk borne by a company.

2.2. Managing regulatory risk {#sec2.2}
-----------------------------

A common way of managing risk in regulation is through taking risk into account in regulatory price determination. Regulators will typically use a weighted average cost of capital (WACC) based on the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) to estimate the return required by investors commensurate with the risks that they face ([@bib15]). Within this approach a 'beta' value reflects the systematic (non-diversifable) risk associated with a firm. There are a number of well-known difficulties associated with estimating this parameter. Estimates of beta are not stable over time so estimates based on the historic beta of the firm may not be a reliable indicator of a firm\'s future cost of capital. Further, estimates of beta can be difficult to obtain when regulated companies are not quoted on stock exchanges, or where they undertake a wide range of activities across a range of industries and sectors, and in different countries ([@bib9]).

There are other measures that can be adopted to manage the uncertainty faced by a regulated firm, in addition to taking account of the perceived risk in cost of capital measures applied in regulatory price determinations. A convenient conceptual framework to analyze sources of risk regulatory risk, and measures that can be used to ameliorate regulatory risk, is provided by [@bib29]. [@bib29] undertook a study on behalf of UK regulators on aspects of the cost of capital for regulated utilities in the UK. Their analysis of regulatory risk highlights that the type of uncertainty faced by a firm is an important determinant of the effect of regulation on its beta. They distinguish two conceptually different forms of regulatory risk. One form of regulatory risk arises from factors that are external to the firm and the regulator, such as macro-economic shocks, but have an impact on the regulatory scheme employed, such as the level of a price cap. The second source they identify relates to risk arising from factors that are internal to the regulatory process. Where regulatory agencies have statutory independence, and operate within legal frameworks provided by governments, a further conceptual distinction can be made within the regulatory process. Risks related to features of the regulatory frameworks provided by governments can be distinguished from risks related to discretionary action by regulators under a given regulatory framework.

### 2.2.1. Risks which are 'external' to the firm and the regulator {#sec2.2.1}

There are constraints and other measures in regulatory frameworks which can mitigate the risks associated with cost or demand changes related to the economic cycle leading to risks arising from market uncertainty.

The use of cost pass-through provisions associated with uncontrollable factors for small infrequent changes, such as costs related to changes in government mandated security requirements, are a constraint used in price cap approaches to mitigate risks. [@bib29] find that uncertainty on the cost side will cause the firm\'s beta (non-diversifiable risk) to increase in the case of a firm subject to a price cap which does not have freedom to choose the activities it undertakes but has some costs that are uncontrollable. Cost pass-through provisions can mitigate the effect in the case of cost uncertainty. If the regulatory is constrained to make small changes infrequently to the price cap then there is little systematic regulatory risk.

Specific governance arrangements can be incorporated in regulatory frameworks to accommodate uncertainties, such as external shocks. Reviews with review principles can be put in place to deal with uncertainties that are highly unlikely but have major effects when they do occur. For these uncertainties governance arrangements can pre-specify procedures for consultation, negotiation and decision making, which should at least reduce the time taken to respond to shocks and improve the transparency of decisions ([@bib25]).

### 2.2.2. Risks which are 'internal' to the regulatory process {#sec2.2.2}

[@bib23] identify that there can be a reduction of regulatory risk through regulatory reform. There are principles of 'good regulation' which have been developed over time. There are a number of principles which are generally regarded as important in achieving good economic regulation of infrastructure. In Australia, the Federal and State governments have agreed a set of principles through the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) that regulatory processes should be consistent with:1.Establishing a case for action before addressing a problem;2.A range of feasible policy options must be considered, including self-regulatory, co-regulatory and non-regulatory approaches, and their benefits and costs assessed;3.Adopting the option that generates the greatest net benefit for the community;4.In accordance with the Competition Principles Agreement, legislation should not restrict competition unless it can be demonstrated that:aThe benefits of the restrictions to the community as a whole outweigh the costs, and.bThe objectives of the regulation can only be achieved by restricting competition;5.Providing effective guidance to relevant regulators and regulated parties in order to ensure that the policy intent and expected compliance requirements of the regulation are clear;6.Ensuring that regulation remains relevant and effective over time;7.Consulting effectively with affected key stakeholders at all stages of the regulatory cycle; and8.Government action should be effective and proportional to the issue being addressed ([@bib18], p.4).

The first three and the eighth of the above principles relates to regulating only when it is warranted and imposing regulation that is proportionate to the situation. Principle five contributes to the predictability of a regulatory framework. There are similarities between the Australian principles for good regulation and principles established in other jurisdictions. In the UK two of six high level principles relevant to the design of economic regulation include 'predictability' and 'adaptability' (UK [@bib16]). In terms of 'predictability' the principles are that:•The framework for economic regulation should provide a stable and objective environment enabling all those affected to anticipate the context for future decisions and to make long term investment decisions with confidence•The framework of economic regulation should not unreasonably unravel past decisions, and should allow efficient and necessary investments to receive a reasonable return, subject to the normal risks inherent in markets (UK [@bib16], p.5)

In terms of 'adaptability' the relevant principle is that:•The framework of economic regulation needs capacity to evolve, to respond to changing circumstances and continue to be relevant and effective over time (p.5)

The OECD/ITF Forum on "Better Economic Regulation: the role of the regulator" recognized that the choice of governance structure is driven by context and that the context is subject to change, therefore it is necessary to regularly re-assess the case for regulation ([@bib25]). Increased potential for competition tends to weaken the support for regulation that may have existed. The need for market stability and temporal consistency should trigger change where necessary, but reassessment should not cause disruption. The regulatory design should allow for gradual change in order to reduce the likelihood of abrupt change.

The use of 'principles of good regulation' by governments in the design of regulatory frameworks, and by regulators in their application of regulatory frameworks, is a general approach that can contribute to reducing regulatory risk. In addition, regulators can reduce risk through practices which increase the predictability of their approach. Establishing methodologies, transparent decision making processes and issuing 'guidelines' related to prospective assessments that regulators expect to make, are examples of these regulatory practices.

Two approaches to price caps from experience in the Australian aviation industry illustrate the effect of different aspects of regulation on regulatory risk.

3. Price cap regulation of airport services in Australia {#sec3}
========================================================

3.1. The price caps established for privatized airports {#sec3.1}
-------------------------------------------------------

The major airports (capital city airports and major regional airports) were privatized in three stages in 1997, 1998 and 2002. The first group, involving Melbourne, Brisbane and Perth airports, were privatized in 1997. The second group, involved Adelaide, Alice Springs, Canberra, Gold Coast, Darwin, Hobart, Launceston and Townsville, were privatized in 1998. Sydney airport, 'the jewel in the crown', operated as a separate corporatized entity under prices surveillance provisions until it was privatized in 2002.

The Australian Government adopted a package of airport-specific economic regulation as part of the privatization of the airports, including (CPI-X) price cap regulation of aeronautical services, monitoring of the quality of airport services, airport specific access regulation and mandatory reporting of financial and other performance information. The Government determined the level of 'X' in the CPI-X price caps before privatization of the airports based on advice it sought from the ACCC. The government\'s policy on airport pricing was:"The X value in the CPI-X price cap reflects expected general productivity improvements which can be made in the delivery of aeronautical services at each airport. The Government is setting the X value on an airport-by-airport basis, for a five year period. (Australian Government, Department of Transport and Regional Development, *Pricing Policy Paper*, November [@bib11], pp.2--3)"

Given the Government\'s policy, the 'X' values were primarily based on analysis of the airports\' expected productivity using benchmarking to estimate the potential for future airport productivity gains. (This approach to the determination of 'X' values was akin to 'pure' price caps and contrasted to the determination of 'X' values by a 'hybrid' price cap approach involving the establishment of a regulatory asset base and estimation of efficient operating costs.) The level of the price caps was established on an individual airport basis. While the level of price caps was made publicly known prior to the sale of the airports, the basis of their determination was not. The starting point prices for the price caps were the aeronautical prices charged before the airport privatizations.

At the time, the Government\'s policy in establishing the regulatory arrangements was "to protect airport users from any potential abuse of market power by airport operators" while at the same time encouraging negotiation between airports and airlines. The price caps were to be reviewed within five years of their operation with the possibility that price caps would no longer apply after the first five year period (Australian Government, Department of Transport and Regional Development, *Pricing Policy Paper*, November [@bib11], p.1)."It is the Government\'s intention to step back from setting prices at individual, privately-leased airports; and to provide a framework in which -- over time -- airport operators and their customers are encouraged to negotiate directly, and resolve prices rather than involve the Government of the day. (Australian Government, Department of Transport and Regional Development, *Pricing Policy Paper*, November [@bib11], p.1)"

The price caps contained some features which reduced airports exposure to risk. The price caps had cost pass-through provisions for the (direct) costs associated with mandated government security. In addition, under and over-recovery provisions allowed carry over between periods of unused parts of the cap and passing back excess revenue where the price cap had been exceeded.

3.2. The new investment provisions {#sec3.2}
----------------------------------

The price caps had provision for airports to recover the cost of 'necessary new investment' through price rises above the cap which was an unusual feature for regulatory frameworks at the time. The ACCC was required to assess 'necessary new investment' proposals against specified guidelines, including that airport users with a significant interest in the investment supported the airport\'s proposal. The provisions did not define 'necessary new investment'. Some investment had been already factored into the 'X' values, but there had not been a transparent regulatory asset base established as part of the privatization process, and the amounts allowed for investment were not advised to the industry. An exception was provision for a new terminal in the case of Adelaide airport which was known not to be included the initial price cap.

Although the ACCC developed guidelines which defined the concept of 'necessary new investment' to distinguish it from other investment, the provision remained ill-defined and difficult to interpret. Airports and airlines could not agree on what constituted 'new investment'. In a number of cases the parties did not agree on whether an expenditure item was new investment or maintenance ([@bib1]). A large number of applications for cost pass through of 'necessary new investment' were made to the ACCC. A multitude of price determinations resulted in price cap regulation being more interventionist than originally envisaged. As a result there was considerable industry uncertainty ([@bib14]).

3.3. Other sources of regulatory risk under airport price caps {#sec3.3}
--------------------------------------------------------------

A further source of uncertainty associated with the regulatory framework for price caps was that the exact coverage of the price cap was unclear and arbitrary. The definition of aeronautical services, which defined the coverage of the price cap, was based on a statutory definition which used the method of charging at the time of privatization as the demarcation between aeronautical and non-aeronautical services. Some new charges, which had not been used at Australian airports before, in particular fuel throughput levies and charges for taxis, were introduced by some airports and raised concerns for airlines and other users ([@bib1]).

The *Prices Surveillance Act 1983*, was used as the legislative basis for the price caps, and was not suitable for applying price caps to private entities. This legislation was developed in the mid-1980s at a time of high inflation and applied to a wide variety of oligopolistic as well as monopolistic industries. Compliance with the prices surveillance provisions is voluntary and the price caps were to be applied to privatized organizations. This resulted in complicated compliance requirements and Ministerial directions under the legislation being reissued a number of times.

The Government initially applied the same regulatory framework involving CPI -- X price caps to 11 airports. Seven of the 11 airports were significantly smaller than the other four, having less than two million passengers per annum at the time ([Table 1](#tbl1){ref-type="table"} ), and it was not clear that some of these smaller airports had significant market power. The market power of the smallest airports was later assessed as 'low' for five airports and 'low/moderate' for two other airports by the [@bib14]. The administrative burden of the regulatory framework would have been proportionately higher for these smaller airports compared to the larger airports.Table 1Airports in Australia covered by price cap regulation -- passenger numbers.Table 1AirportPassengers\
1997--98\
millionsPassengers\
1998--99\
millionsPassengers\
2001--02\
millions% change passenger numbers - August 2001 to October 2001% change passenger numbers - August 2002 to October 2002Melbourne14.2014.5816.48- 11.6+9.9Brisbane10.5810.7112.32- 13.4+7.3Perth4.864.974.84- 13.3+12.9Adelaide4.094.18- 14.6+11.8Canberra1.821.83- 16.0+6.0Gold Coast1.901.72- 28.3+13.7Darwin1.221.01- 33.7- 16.0Hobart[a](#tbl1fna){ref-type="table-fn"}0.850.94+16.8+13.2Alice Springs0.760.52- 39.7+1.0Townsville0.760.86- 15.1+4.1Launceston[a](#tbl1fna){ref-type="table-fn"}0.520.53- 7.6+16.1Largest 20 airports in Australia.−15.4+8.5[^1]Sources: ACCC Airport Monitoring Reports and BITRE, Monthly Airport Traffic Data for top twenty airports- January 1985 to July 2013.

3.4. The removal of airport price caps {#sec3.4}
--------------------------------------

A culmination of events in September and October 2001, the terrorist attacks in the United States and the demise of a major domestic airline, Ansett Australia, led to a significant downturn in air traffic and ensuing falls in revenues for airports and air navigation services. At the time of these events some airports reported reductions in traffic of 30--40 per cent ([@bib14]). The Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) epidemic followed in 2002. The fall in demand accompanying the demise of Ansett Australia had a relatively more marked effect on some smaller airports in comparison to the effect on larger airports. [Table 1](#tbl1){ref-type="table"} shows passenger numbers at Darwin airport fell by 34%, by 30% at Gold Coast and by 40% at Alice Springs in the two months between August and October 2001. In the same period in the following year there were significant increases in passenger numbers at most airports.

Passenger and aircraft movements at Australian airports for the period 1985--86 to 2012-13 show a dramatic drop at the end of 2001 following a period of growth and with a sharp recovery in 2002. This was a consistent pattern at airports in Australia over this timeframe. [Fig. 1](#fig1){ref-type="fig"}, [Fig. 2](#fig2){ref-type="fig"} below relating to aircraft and passenger movements at Melbourne airport are typical of the pattern of passenger and aircraft movements at Australian airports over this period. The fall in aircraft movements was significantly greater than the fall in passenger movements. [Fig. 3](#fig3){ref-type="fig"} shows total passengers at all Australian airports over the period 1985--86 to 2012--13 for international, domestic and regional traffics.Fig. 1Melbourne airport- total passenger movements -- 1985--86 to 2012--13.Fig. 1Source: [@bib17] Airport Traffic Data 1985--86 to 2012--13. Accessed 27/10/13.<http://www.bitre.gov.au/publications/ongoing/airport_traffic_data.aspx>.Fig. 2Melbourne airport- total aircraft movements -- 1985--86 to 2012--13.Fig. 2Source: [@bib17] Airport Traffic Data 1985--86 to 2012--13. Accessed 27/10/13.<http://www.bitre.gov.au/publications/ongoing/airport_traffic_data.aspx>.Fig. 3Total airports in Australia - passenger movements (millions) - 1985--86 to 2012--13.Fig. 3Source: [@bib17] Airport Traffic Data 1985--86 to 2012--13. Accessed 27/10/13.<http://www.bitre.gov.au/publications/ongoing/airport_traffic_data.aspx>.

In October 2001, prior to the completion of a scheduled review of airport regulation, the Government removed price caps on aeronautical services from smaller airports and issued a direction to the ACCC to allow Melbourne, Brisbane and Perth airports to pass a one-off price increase through the price cap. The allowable price increases were 6.2% for Melbourne, 6.7% for Brisbane and 7.2% for Perth. The Government media release at the time stated:"The Government accepts that it would be difficult for airports to adjust aeronautical prices to compensate for reduced traffic flows, and still comply with the current price oversight arrangements administered by the ACCC. (Australian Government, Minister for Financial Services and Regulation, Press Release, 5 October [@bib12])"

While Melbourne and Brisbane airports implemented the full increases in prices allowed for domestic traffic, they did not implement any price increases for international traffic. The basis of calculation underlying the one-off price increases allowed for Melbourne, Brisbane and Perth airports was not made public. Melbourne Airport was critical of the manner in which the new regulatory arrangements were introduced:"In our view in particular the Treasury should make clear the reasons and the methodology used to arrive at this situation, because otherwise we\'re just going to end up with another situation which is exactly analogous to that debate around what\'s in the value of X ... Indeed, all that\'s happened really is that regulatory uncertainty has been increased ... (Transcript of public hearing quoted in [@bib14], pp.247--8)"

The Productivity [@bib14] commented that:"The basis for the one-off price increases above the cap has not been revealed and this presents similar concerns to those raised ... for the determination of the Xs in the price-cap formula. This may increase unnecessarily regulatory uncertainty for both airports and their users (PC, 2002, pp.247--8)."

On 30 June 2002, following the completion of the Productivity Commission review, the Government removed the remaining airport price caps, that is the price caps on Melbourne, Brisbane and Perth airports. Sydney Airport was privatized without a price cap. A 'light-handed' approach to airport regulation involving price and quality of service monitoring was adopted. The Government commented:"The price monitoring arrangements will provide airports with greater scope to undertake efficient aeronautical investments and more flexibility to a changing aviation environment. (Australian Government, Minister for Transport and Regional Services and Treasurer, Joint Press Release, [@bib13].)"

Additionally, the Government accepted the Productivity Commission\'s view that despite the four largest airports having significant market power, they had limited incentive to use it in the pricing of aeronautical services. This was primarily based on a view that incentives to grow non-aeronautical revenue would be a constraint on the pricing of aeronautical revenue.[4](#fn4){ref-type="fn"}

4. The long term price path for air navigation services {#sec4}
=======================================================

4.1. Economic regulation of Airservices Australia {#sec4.1}
-------------------------------------------------

Moves to establish a long term price path for air navigation services in Australia began in 2002--03, soon after the termination of price caps on airports. Although not called a price cap at the time, the long term price path has the characteristics of a price cap as described by [@bib21].

Airservices is a corporate entity wholly owned by the Australian government and sole provider of air navigation services and aviation firefighting and rescue services in Australia. In comparison to airports, Airservices has a relatively higher proportion of operating and maintenance costs in its total costs ([@bib3]). En route air navigation and terminal navigation use technically complex assets and highly skilled labour. Airservices charges for air navigation and aviation firefighting and rescue (AFFR) are covered by prices surveillance legislation which requires an ACCC price review prior to increasing any of these charges. The Minister for Infrastructure and Transport also has to approve or disapprove Airservices pricing.

Over the period 1995--96 to 2000-01 Airservices adopted a pricing philosophy involving altering prices on an annual basis in response to changing business conditions. Consecutive price reductions in real terms were made over the five years to 2001--02 as a consequence of Airservices substantial cost reductions. In 2001-02 Airservices experienced a downturn in activity resulting from the September 11 terrorist attacks and the Ansett collapse with revenue falling by 11% (Airservices, Annual Report, 2001--2002). This was a relatively greater fall in revenue than that of the major airports. Approximately 97% of Airservices revenue is directly related to activity.[5](#fn5){ref-type="fn"}

4.2. The development of a long term pricing path for Airservices {#sec4.2}
----------------------------------------------------------------

In 2002 Airservices sought to increase prices on the basis of revenue losses ([@bib6]). The ACCC approved the price increases but encouraged Airservices to take a longer term view of its pricing in the future. Airlines supported a longer term approach to pricing to provide greater certainty and incentives for efficiency.

A five year pricing path for the period covering 2004--05 to 2008--09 was developed through an industry working group involving representatives of Airservices and airlines. A standard 'building block methodology' involving the determination of efficient forward looking costs, a regulatory asset base (RAB) and a weighted average cost of capital (WACC) was used to determine required revenue for a five year price period ([@bib3]). The building block model is a well-known and understandable model of price determination commonly used in economic regulation by the ACCC as well as by other regulators. In effect this was a 'hybrid' price cap.

Airservices had concerns about the risks involved in developing a long-term pricing approach given uncertainties with forecasting demand and the durable but technical nature of their assets ([@bib3]). A risk sharing arrangement was supported by airlines to "ensure against any under servicing, thereby ensuring that safety would not be comprised" ([@bib3]). Triggers allowing for the possibility of a price review were incorporated in the five year agreement. They were:•Deviation of aggregate activity levels by 10 per cent or more, above or below forecast levels within a 60-day period and/or 5 per cent in a financial year,•Anticipated divergence of actual capex from the forecast level as a result of revised priorities and/or timing by 50 per cent or more within a single year, or by 25 per cent cumulatively, and•Changes in service levels due to new regulatory or customer requirements resulting in a net change in costs.

Activation of a trigger would oblige Airservices to consult with their customers through established industry committees. Although the approach to be taken to a change in prices was not prescribed, an increase in prices would require notification to the ACCC ([@bib3]).

The long term price path was generally regarded as successful and another long term price path was developed and implemented for prices for the five year period from 2011 to 12 ([@bib4]). Similar triggers for a price review were maintained in the 2011 agreement with a reduction in the level of shortfall in capital expenditure required for a review. In reviewing Airsevices cost of capital (WACC), the ACCC took into account the effect of a reduction in Airservices\' risk as a result of the triggers for price reviews. In addition, there was considerable emphasis on Airservices' efficiency through proposing the development of efficiency indicators and associated industry reporting mechanisms, as well as increased industry disclosure to industry on investment.

4.3. Use of the 'triggers' for review {#sec4.3}
-------------------------------------

The activity level variation trigger has been the only trigger that has been used to-date.[6](#fn6){ref-type="fn"} This has involved downward price movements as a result of higher levels of activity than forecast. 'Rebates' of between 0.3 and 5 per cent of 'airways' revenue have been given to airlines in the second half of the next financial year in each year between 2007--08 and 2012--13 ([Table 2](#tbl2){ref-type="table"} ).Table 2[@bib7] revenue rebates to industry.Table 2YearAirways revenue\
millionsRebate to industry\
millionsPercentage2007--08\$726.4\$26.33.62008--09\$751.5\$19.92.62009--10\$785.3\$17.72.22010--11\$836.9\$41.95.02011--12\$863.1\$2.30.32012--13\$935\$6.80.7Source: Derived from Airservices Australia Annual Reports. Downloaded 2 December 2013.<http://www.airservicesaustralia.com/publications/corporate-publications/annual-reports/>.

5. How did regulation of airports and air navigation services in Australia handle the problems of uncertainty? {#sec5}
==============================================================================================================

The development and application of price caps to airports services in Australia was amongst the earliest experience of 'modern' regulation of utilities in Australia, following immediately on from the Australian Government\'s adoption of major competition policy reforms in 1995. The price caps were akin to 'pure' price caps in that the level of the 'X' in the price were primarily determined by the scope for productivity improvement over time based on forecast information. Compared to the previous cost based approach to regulation of airport services, the new relatively 'pure' price caps would have had the effect of providing strong incentives for airports to reduce operating costs and grow passenger numbers. It could also be expected that airlines risks associated with airport pricing in the new privatized environment would be lowered due to the constraints on pricing and the incentives airports had to achieve efficiency gains.

The design of the price caps included cost pass through provisions related to Government mandated security costs and also for "necessary new investment". There was very little scope to vary the level of price caps outside these provisions within the five year period prior to the planned review of the regulatory arrangements. The cost pass through provisions relating to security requirements would have the effect of reducing risk faced by the airports. However, the cost pass through provisions relating to "necessary new investment" were ambiguous and resulted in much greater regulatory intervention than had been anticipated at the outset of privatization. The lack of clarity as to the investment costs that were covered by the price caps increased risks for airports and airlines alike. The existence of this unusual price cap feature encouraged airports to seek price increases above the level of the cap for a wide variety of investments, both large and small. The effects on uncertainty and incentives that resulted from this provision is likely to have been an important factor which contributed to the Government\'s removal of price caps on airports (see [3.2](#sec3.2){ref-type="sec"}, [3.4](#sec3.4){ref-type="sec"}).

From [Table 1](#tbl1){ref-type="table"} it can be seen that the effect of the sudden downturn in activity from August to October 2001 was markedly different between airports. Price caps had been applied to some very small airports which suffered the largest declines in passenger numbers. These smaller airports also had relatively little market power compared to the largest three airports, Brisbane, Melbourne and Perth. In taking actions to ameliorate the significant decline in passenger volumes at the largest three airports, the Government only considered the negative shocks on demand and neglected the positive benefits that airports can gain from unexpectedly positive economic conditions. [Table 1](#tbl1){ref-type="table"} and [Fig. 1](#fig1){ref-type="fig"}, [Fig. 3](#fig3){ref-type="fig"} shows passenger numbers recovering quickly after 2001 and far exceeding the 2001 peaks.

The Australian Governments concern that the price caps did not allow "flexibility to adjust to a changing aviation environment" in its response to the Productivity Commission\'s report raises the question of whether this was a deficiency in the design of the price caps. Should the price caps have incorporated provisions reducing the impact of unexpected large and sudden volume changes? In a competitive industry a response to a fall in demand would not be accommodated by price rises. Additionally, the airlines and other parts of the aviation industry experienced significant falls in demand. However, relative to competitive industries and other parts of the aviation industry, major airports have high sunk costs and significant indivisibilities, and therefore more limited capacity to adjust their cost structure in the short term. It seems likely that the provision of an arrangement in the price cap to allow a temporary adjustment for rare occasions where an airports solvency could be at stake would reduce risks. For example, it may be possible to design a mechanism where in specified circumstances an airport would be able to get some limited relief by not reducing prices in line with the price cap. This could be a temporary 'borrowing' against future revenues which are paid back through compensating price adjustments at a later time.

Removal of the airport price caps reduced risk substantially for these airports and shifted risk towards the airlines. The Australian price monitoring, which replaced the price caps, has limited effectiveness in providing a constraint on the use of airport market power ([@bib10]). The maintenance of infrastructure solvency and profitability was a factor recognized by airlines in their support of review triggers for the pricing of air navigation services provided by Airservices Australia. The risk mitigation strategy adopted in the Airservices price agreement appears to take a risk-neutral position over the longer term. It allows Airservices to earn only its cost of capital as reflected by the two sided nature of the aggregate activity level trigger and the ACCC approach to reviewing Airservices' cost of capital.[7](#fn7){ref-type="fn"} The ACCC has also encouraged Airservices to develop, in conjunction with airlines, more efficiency indicators of performance, including for capital expenditure ([@bib4]). These characteristics are likely to have resulted in the regulatory framework becoming progressively more risk adverse, as well as becoming more complicated and associated with higher administrative costs.

The importance of the use of 'principles of good regulation' in designing regulatory frameworks and their effect on uncertainty is also illustrated by the two cases. The airport price caps were developed prior to the sale process so that 'X' values would be known to airport bidders. The political process determined characteristics of the design of the caps, including the coverage of price caps both in terms of which airports had price caps and which services were under the caps. The lack of transparency of the asset base that the price caps applied to, and lack of clarity relating to whether some new services were covered by the price caps, were among features of the price caps that raised significant uncertainty. Airservices price agreements were established subsequent to the development of airport price caps and benefited from 'lessons learned' from the airport experience. Additionally, air navigation services are provided by a single entity, which is corporatized and not privatized simplifies the regulatory process. However, the success of the arrangement in reducing regulatory risk can also be attributed to the greater use of principles of good regulation, including transparency, predictability, adaptability of the framework, and consultation, which were used in the establishment of the Airservices\' price agreements.

6. Conclusions on regulation of aviation infrastructure facing uncertainty {#sec6}
==========================================================================

In theory, economic regulation through the application of price caps to a regulated firm can increase a firm\'s risk if they prevent a firm from responding to sudden unexpected changes in the demand for services and uncontrollable cost increases. [@bib9], [@bib8], [@bib19], [@bib21] and [@bib26] support the view that the details of the regulatory specification matter in terms of the effect on risk. Specific measures can be incorporated within general forms of regulation, such as price caps, which can have the effect of reducing risk the regulated firm faces. As the survey article by [@bib28] concludes it is the exact specification of the regulatory system that matters in relation to investment.

The conceptual distinction provided by [@bib29] separates the measures which affect regulatory risk into those that are external to regulation, such as demand volatility, and those that are internal to the regulatory process, such as the political and legal framework and the discretionary behavior of the regulator. This distinction is useful because it assists with identifying the source of regulatory risk and indicates the nature of design features to incorporate in regulatory frameworks. Experience of regulation of aviation infrastructure in Australia involving in the application of price caps to airports and air navigation services, illustrates the effect of regulatory risks that were external and internal to the regulatory process.

In addition to the broad structure of price cap regulation there are other features of the regulatory framework that are important in considering the risk facing aviation infrastructure. The degree of predictability of regulatory behavior, that is a regulator\'s discretionary power, in the form of unpredicted regulatory interventions, are factors that can increase the volatility of a company\'s returns and a regulated company\'s cost of capital. [@bib23], [@bib25] and [@bib26] identify the role that regulatory reform can play in reducing regulatory risk. The use of principles of 'good regulation', which include principles such as transparency, predictability, adaptability of regulatory frameworks to changed market circumstances, regulation that is proportional to the situation that it is applied to, consultation in regulatory processes and effective and clear regulatory guidance, are among measures which can be adopted to reduce regulatory risk. The different experiences of price cap regulation applied to airports and air navigation services in Australia illustrates, amongst other things, the importance of these principles.
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'Aeronautical services' include services related to aircraft movements and passenger processing.

CPI stands for the retail price index while X is the expected efficiency gains by the company.

See 'Acknowledgements' section.

The extent to which non-aeronautical revenues were likely to act as a constraint on aeronautical prices was subject to debate and subsequently revised downwards in later Productivity Commission reports.

'Airways' revenue is Airservices revenue attributable to air navigation services and aviation rescue and firefighting services is approximately 97% of total revenue (see annual reports).

Based on discussions with industry and review of Airservices annual reports.

In the 2011 Airservices price review the ACCC was concerned that the weighted average cost of capital took appropriate account of the reduced risk to Airservices from the price review triggers ([@bib4]).

[^1]: Hobart and Launceston are located on the island state of Tasmania.
